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Gender Differences in Risk Aversion and Ambiguity Aversion
*
 
This paper demonstrates gender differences in risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. It also 
contributes to a growing literature relating economic preference parameters to psychological 
measures by asking whether variations in preference parameters among persons, and in 
particular across genders, can be accounted for by differences in personality traits and traits 
of cognition. Women are more risk averse than men. Over an initial range, women require no 
further compensation for the introduction of ambiguity but men do. At greater levels of 
ambiguity, women have the same marginal distaste for increased ambiguity as men. 
Psychological variables account for some of the interpersonal variation in risk aversion. They 
explain none of the differences in ambiguity. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A classic study by Ellsberg (1961) found that people place higher values on bets 
with known probabilities (risk) than bets with unknown probabilities (uncertainty). He 
termed this preference ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity aversion has been used to 
rationalize the equity-premium puzzle and to explain why people act differently in 
complex situations (Seo, forthcoming). Hansen (2005, 2007) establishes conditions under 
which the prices of risky and uncertain choices depend separately on risk aversion 
parameters and ambiguity aversion (model uncertainty aversion) parameters. Unresolved 
in this literature is whether risk and ambiguity aversion are empirically distinct 
preference parameters.  
This paper shows that in real world choices, the two parameters are distinct and 
that they differ across genders. Supporting the two distinct roles played by these 
parameters, differences across people in risk aversion, but not ambiguity aversion, can be 
related to standard psychological measurements. This paper contributes to an emerging 
literature surveyed in Borghans et al. (2008) that relates economic preference parameters 
to psychological measurements. From a baseline risky situation, we link valuations of 
bets to cognitive and noncognitive personality traits: IQ, the Big Five (openness, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism), grit (ambition), self control 
and flexible thinking. 
Using Halevy’s (2007) version of Ellsberg’s measure of ambiguity aversion, we 
investigate how the willingness to pay for lotteries changes when the degree of ambiguity 
is varied. Ambiguity aversion is studied by presenting participants in an experiment with 
urns containing ten balls which can be either blue or yellow. In some urns, the 
composition of blue and yellow balls is known. In other urns, the composition is not 
known. Participants bet on a color and give a minimum price at which they would sell the 
bet.  
For men and women separately, we study risk aversion and changes in measured 
ambiguity aversion when the degree of ambiguity is increased. We analyze whether 
cognitive and noncognitive factors explain differences in risk and ambiguity aversion 
between men and women.   3
Our experiment is conducted on a sample of 347 15- and 16-year-old students at a 
Dutch high-school. Only a fraction of them continue their education to the university 
level. The sample population studied offers a wider dispersion of traits than does the 
sample of university students analyzed by Halevy (2007). A unique feature of our 
experiment is that participation was compulsory. We also know who among our sample 
would have voluntarily participated because we initially sought volunteers, and the final 
sample includes the initial sample of volunteers.  
Women are more risk averse than men. Over an initial range, men reduce their 
valuation of ambiguous urns more than women. After that, men and women equally value 
marginal changes in ambiguity. To the best of our knowledge, these findings are novel. 
Since psychological measures are related to risk but not to ambiguity, risk aversion and 
ambiguity aversion are distinct traits since they depend on different variables.  
  Our evidence provides fresh insight into the relationship between psychological 
traits and economic preference parameters. There is a lot of evidence that women are 
more risk averse than men (see e.g. Hartog et al. 2002; Agnew et al. 2008). With respect 
to ambiguity aversion, Schubert et al. (1999) find that women are more ambiguity averse 
than men in an investment context but not in an insurance context.
1  Powell and Ansic 
(1997) report that women are more risk averse and ambiguity averse. Dohmen et al. 
(2008) find that lower cognitive ability and less openness to new experiences predict 
greater risk aversion. Benjamin, Brown and Shapiro (2006) report that small-stakes risk 
aversion and short-run time preference are inversely related to achievement test scores. 
Borghans et al. (2008) review this literature. 
This paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 describes the 
experimental procedure. Section 3 discusses the empirical results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Experimental design and procedure 
 
2.1 Structure of the experiment 
 
                                                 
1 However, contrary to a large literature, Schubert et al. (1999) report no gender difference in risk aversion 
when decisions are made in an insurance or investment context.  They do find that women are more risk 
averse in abstract gambling decisions.   4
In our experiment, students are presented with different urns each containing 10 
balls which can be either blue or yellow. They are asked to bet on a color and value each 
of these urns, considering that one ball will be drawn and that they will receive €2 if they 
guess the right color.  
We use four urns that differ gradually in their degree of ambiguity, labeled urn 1, 
urn 2, urn 3 and urn 4 respectively. The urns are presented in randomized order to the 
participants. After the students value the urns, a uniform random number is drawn to 
locate which of the urns is used for payment. In a second round we repeat the same menu 
of choices. We use average scores over both rounds in our analysis. 
Urn 1 is the case with only risk and is described as: “There is an urn with 5 blue 
and 5 yellow balls. At random, one ball will be drawn from this urn. If you guess the 
right color, you’ll earn €2. If you are wrong, you’ll get nothing.” In urn 2 we introduce 
some ambiguity: “There is an urn with 10 blue and yellow balls, but the number of 
yellow and blue balls is unknown. It can be anything between 4 and 6 blue balls and 4 
and 6 yellow balls. At random, one ball will be drawn from this urn. If you guess the 
right color, you’ll earn €2. If you are wrong, you’ll get nothing.” In urn 3 ambiguity is 
further increased varying the number of blue and yellow balls between 2 and 8: “There is 
an urn with 10 blue and yellow balls, but the number of yellow and blue balls is 
unknown. It can be anything between 2 and 8 blue balls and 2 and 8 yellow balls. At 
random, one ball will be drawn from this urn. If you guess the right color, you’ll earn €2. 
If you are wrong, you’ll get nothing.” In urn 4 ambiguity is further increased by varying 
the number of blue and yellow balls between 0 and 10: “There is an urn with 10 blue and 
yellow balls, but the number of yellow and blue balls is unknown. It can be anything 
between 0 and 10 blue balls and 0 and 10 yellow balls. At random, one ball will be drawn 
from this urn. If you guess the right color, you’ll earn €2. If you are wrong, you’ll get 
nothing.” Urns 1 (risk) and 4 (uncertainty) represent the classic Ellsberg questions. Urns 
2 and 3 are added to analyze how reservation prices change in response to changes in 
ambiguity. 
For each urn, students are asked to bet on a color and to give the minimum price 
at which they would be willing to sell the bet. If an urn is selected for actual payment, a 
computer generates a random offer between 0 and 200 eurocents. If the offer is higher   5
than the reservation price set by the participant, the bet is automatically sold and the 
participant gains the money the computer offered. If the offer is lower than the 
reservation price, the lottery is actually carried out by spinning a wheel similar to a pie-
chart that indicates the distribution of yellow and blue balls. In the case of ambiguous 
urns, ambiguity is resolved when the pie-chart is revealed. When the wheel of the 
selected pie-chart stops spinning, the participants can see whether the arrow points at a 
blue or a yellow ball. 
Before the experiment begins, subjects are given an interactive tutorial to educate 
them on how to set reservation prices. In the tutorial, they are asked to set the reservation 
price for a one euro coin. If they set the reservation price higher than 101 eurocents or 
below 100 eurocents they are instructed that they make a loss using that strategy. For 
students who set the wrong reservation price, the questions and explanation are repeated.
2 
The tutorial ends with two hypothetical Ellsberg questions.  
 
2.2 IQ and Psychological Traits 
 
  We collect several measures of IQ and personality. In this paper we use: 8 Raven 
Progressive Matrices to measure IQ; 50 items to measure the BIG 5 (Openness, 
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Neuroticism) from Goldberg (1992); 5 
questions to measure ambition from Duckworth’s et al. (2007) Grit-scale; 10 items from 
the Self control Act Frequency Measure (Duckworth, 2008); and 10 items from the 
Stanovich and West (1997) Flexible Thinking Scale. 
  We also obtained an achievement test (CITO), with scores taken at age 12, and 
the scores on the Differential Aptitude Test, another achievement test. Except for the 
flexible thinking indicator, all measured traits have high Cronbach’s Alphas, a measure of 
inter-correlation among scores. People with high IQs are less extraverted, have more self-
control, are able to think more flexibly, make fewer cognitive mistakes, and have lower 
rates of time preference. 
 
                                                 
2 Table A1 in appendix 1 shows that students who score high on flexible thinking and the Raven test less 
often set wrong reservation prices in this tutorial. Agreeable and extraverted students set wrong reservation 
prices more often.   6
2.3 Procedures 
 
Our subjects attend a high school near Maastricht, in the Netherlands. This school 
educates diverse students who will attain different levels of education. There is more 
diversity in our sample than in the samples of university students widely used in the 
literature. There are three academic tracks. We exclude students from the lowest track. 
The middle track is vocational. The upper track is collegiate. 
Participation was compulsory. The students in our samples are 15 and 16 years of 
age. Some of the students had valid reasons not to participate. Of an initial sample of 374 
students, 347 students (93.1%) actually participated. A unique feature of the data is that 
we also know who would have participated in the event there were voluntary 
participation because we initially sought volunteers (52 students volunteered).  
Most students finish the experiment within 1.5 hours. The maximum time spent is 
almost 2 hours. On average, they earn €21.30 with a minimum of €8.20 and a maximum 
of €36.60. In the Netherlands, a normal wage for a 16 year old person is around €3 per 
hour. Most students in this age group do not work and receive on average €20 per month 
as pocket money (NIBUD, 2005). Thus the amounts earned by participants were 
relatively high compared to their alternative wages. The money is paid in cash after 
students finish the experiment. During the experiment, students are notified of their 




  Table 1 reports the reservation prices averaged over rounds 1 and 2 that 
respondents give for urns 1 and 4.
3  The difference in the valuation of urns 1 and 4 is a 
measure of ambiguity aversion. On average, students are ambiguity averse. The 
reservation price of urn 1 is 12.4 cents higher than that of urn 4 (p-value=0.000). This 
                                                 
3 There is no statistically significant difference between the scores on round 1 and 2. See table A2 in 
appendix 2.   7
supports the analysis of Hansen that ambiguity (model uncertainty) lowers the value of a 
choice distinct from any effect arising from risk aversion.
4  
Men have much higher reservation prices for urn 1 than women so they are less 
risk averse than women. However, men display more ambiguity aversion than women in 
the sense that the difference in reservation prices between urn 1 and urn 4 is larger for 
men than for women.  
Figure 1 plots the changes in the reservation price when the degree of ambiguity 
is successively increased in the lotteries. For men, the reservation price decreases sharply 
when ambiguity increases from urn 1 (no ambiguity) to urn 2 (moderate ambiguity: 4-6 
balls). For women, there is no change in the reservation price moving from urn 1 to urn 2. 
When ambiguity increases further (urn 3: 2-8 balls and urn 4: 0-10 balls) the decrease in 
value of the lottery for men is similar to the decrease for women. The gap in reservation 
prices remains the same for urns 3 and 4. Men and women price marginal increases of 
ambiguity in the same way. 
One potential explanation for gender differences is that risk and ambiguity are 
related to cognitive and noncognitive traits on which men and women differ. Table 2 
reports the empirical relationship between the reservation prices of the risky urn and the 
difference between the ambiguous urns and the risky urn as dependent variables and the 
Raven IQ and personality traits as independent variables. The value of the risky urn is 
affected by personality traits while the difference between ambiguous urns and the risky 
urn is not. People who are less agreeable, less neurotic and who have more ambition are 
less risk averse (i.e. set a higher reservation price for urn 1). The model with the highest 
ambiguity (urn 4-urn 1) has approximately half the R-squared of the model for urn 1. This 
difference is larger for women than for men. None of the psychological traits is 
associated with differences in ambiguity aversion (see F-test at the base of the table). 
This evidence is consistent with the existence of two distinct preference parameters. 
Separating the analysis for men and women, we find that women who have more 
                                                 
4 Separately analyzing the people who volunteered and those who did not, risk aversion is greater for the 
volunteers while ambiguity aversion is somewhat lower. This suggests that the people who sort into 
experiments are less fearful of uncertainty. However, these differences are not statistically significant. The 
standard deviation of reservation prices is lower for the volunteers (the difference is statistically significant 
for urns 3 and 4), especially for the answers of volunteers who are in the collegiate track. For this group the 
difference is statistically significant for Urn 1, 3 and 4. See table A3 in appendix 3.   8
ambition are less risk averse. Men who have more self-control are more risk averse.    
Adjusting for psychological traits explains little of the gender difference in risk aversion 




This paper analyzes gender differences in risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. 
Using Halevy’s (2007) measure of ambiguity aversion, we investigate how the 
willingness to pay increases when the degree of ambiguity is reduced. We analyze the 
extent to which differences in the evaluations of risk and ambiguity are related to 
cognitive and personality traits. 
Our analysis confirms findings from a previous literature that women are more 
risk averse than men. Women initially respond to ambiguity much more favorably than 
men (i.e. their reservation price does not decline), but as ambiguity increases, men and 
women show similar marginal valuations of ambiguity. Psychological traits are strongly 
associated with risk but not to ambiguity. Adjusting for psychological traits explains a 
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Urn 1 Urn 2   Urn 3   Urn 4
Degree of Ambiguity
Female Male
   12
Table 1 
Risk and Ambiguity aversion for volunteers and non-volunteers and by gender 
 
 
N  Urn 1  Urn 4 
 
Ambiguity aversion  
(Difference in reservation prices between  
Urn 4 and Urn 1) 
























1 and 4 
Total  347  93.2  46.6 2.5    80.9  48.2 2.6   12.4  31.0 1.7    0.000 
Non volunteer 
 

















Volunteer  52  86.0  41.1 5.7  0.228  74.8  40.1 5.6 0.323 11.2  29.1 4.0 0.757  0.008 
Volunteer in 
collegiate track  
 

















Women  163  80.0  49.2 3.9  Ref  72.7  51.5 4.0  Ref  7.5  29.6 2.3  Ref  0.002 
Men  184  104.9  41.0 3.0  0.000  88.1  43.9 3.2 0.003 16.8  31.5 2.3 0.005  0.000 
* P-values of difference between specific group and a reference group indicted by “ref”.  13
Figure 2 
Difference between male and female reservation prices, controlling for 









































Urn 1 Urn 2   Urn 3   Urn 4
Degree of Ambiguity
Regression Adjusted Original
   14
Table 2 
Risk and ambiguity and (non)cognitive traits (Standard errors in parentheses). 
 ALL  MEN  WOMEN 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
  Urn 1  Urn 2-Urn 1Urn 3-Urn 1 Urn 4-Urn 1 Urn 1  Urn 2-Urn 1Urn 3-Urn 1 Urn 4-Urn 1 Urn 1  Urn 2-Urn 1Urn 3-Urn 1Urn 4-Urn 1
                    
Raven  IQ  0.101  0.068 -0.104  -0.073  0.063 0.127 -0.121 -0.038  0.284  -0.022 -0.111 -0.136 
  (0.109)  (0.062) (0.074)  (0.075)  (0.132) (0.088) (0.107)  (0.108)  (0.170) (0.086) (0.104) (0.105) 
Conscientiousness  -2.045  0.315 0.754  -2.605  5.021 2.960 -0.068 -3.068  -10.072 -2.678 0.937 -2.361 
  (3.756)  (2.127) (2.577)  (2.580)  (4.489) (2.998) (3.635)  (3.654)  (6.052) (3.054) (3.723) (3.732) 
Extraversion  0.707  -0.230 -1.796  -1.071  2.601 -0.021 -0.731  0.542 0.382  -0.294 -3.343 -3.018 
  (2.939)  (1.664) (2.008)  (2.019)  (3.760) (2.512) (3.045)  (3.061)  (4.362) (2.201) (2.656) (2.690) 
Agreeableness -7.804*  2.872 3.367  3.501  -4.957  1.565 0.787  2.235  -0.022 -0.162 3.641 1.247 
  (3.087)  (1.748) (2.104)  (2.121)  (3.676) (2.456) (2.977)  (2.993)  (5.784) (2.918) (3.498) (3.566) 
Neuroticism  -6.187*  -0.921 2.414  2.086  -4.910  -1.278 3.032  4.215  -2.997 -3.178 0.972 -1.773 
  (2.979)  (1.687) (2.043)  (2.047)  (4.026) (2.689) (3.260)  (3.277)  (4.537) (2.289) (2.770) (2.797) 
Openness  6.461  1.032 -2.594  -3.055  0.322 3.579  0.116  -0.774 8.386  -1.154 -5.143 -5.765 
  (3.291)  (1.863) (2.243)  (2.261)  (4.243) (2.834) (3.436)  (3.454)  (5.081) (2.564) (3.073) (3.133) 
Ambition  8.978* -0.085  -2.686  -3.720  -1.912  -0.641  2.703  -2.239 14.170* 2.707  -6.167  -2.156 
  (3.704)  (2.097) (2.525)  (2.545)  (4.663) (3.115) (3.776)  (3.796)  (5.813) (2.933) (3.515) (3.584) 
Flexible  thinking  1.476  0.361 4.604  3.115  -1.492  -0.447 4.675  4.486  3.589  0.861 5.315 1.608 
  (3.855)  (2.183) (2.629)  (2.648)  (4.658) (3.112) (3.772)  (3.792)  (6.114) (3.085) (3.705) (3.770) 
Self  control  -6.876  -2.915 0.803  2.909 -10.355*  -5.301 0.494  2.755  -3.115 -0.406 2.826 3.443 
  (4.148)  (2.348) (2.849)  (2.849)  (4.996) (3.337) (4.046)  (4.067)  (6.791) (3.427) (4.170) (4.188) 
Constant  88.470* -7.412*  -5.508  -8.273  101.002* -14.242*  -8.647  -13.119* 67.060* 2.805  -2.897  -0.280 
  (6.500)  (3.680) (4.435)  (4.466)  (7.740) (5.170) (6.268)  (6.301)  (10.874) (5.487) (6.607) (6.705) 
Observations  327  327 326  327  169 169 169  169  158  158 157 158 
R-squared  0.087  0.021 0.038  0.040  0.047 0.050 0.028  0.029  0.131  0.025 0.088 0.072 
F-test set of 
explanatory 
variables 
3.37*  0.50 0.49  0.94  0.86 0.93 1.06  0.98  2.47*  0.96 1.20 0.61 




Personality and the probability of setting wrong reservation prices in the tutorial 
(Standard errors in parentheses). 
  
 Coef. 














Flexible thinking  -0.104** 
 (0.042) 
Self control  0.020 
 (0.045) 
Constant 0.580 
  (0.071) 
R-squared 0.066 
* p<10%, ** p<5%. 
 
Note: the dependent variable is a dummy with value 1 if the wrong reservation price was 








reservation price round 1 minus reservation price round 2 
Std. Err. 
 
95% Conf. Interval 
 
Urn 1  2.0  2.2  -2.4  6.4 
Urn 2  2.8  2.2  -1.6  7.3 
Urn 3  3.0  2.2  -1.4  7.4 
Urn 4  3.7  2.5  -1.2  8.6 
 
 




Differences in standard deviations of the urns between volunteers and non-volunteers and 
men and women. 
   
  urn1 urn2 urn3 urn4 
St. dev. non volunteers minus volunteers  6.4  1.8  8.8  9.3 
P-values for test st.dev non volunteer >  st.dev  volunteer  0.11 0.38 0.04 0.04 
St. dev. non volunteers minus volunteers in collegiate track  9.6  3.6  11.7  10.9 
P-values for test st.dev non volunteers > st.dev VWO volunteer in 
collegiate  track  0.05 0.28 0.02 0.03 
St. dev. women minus men  8.2  7.8  5.9  7.6 
P-values for test st.dev women >  st.dev  men  0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 
 
  